

# Table 1 List of Factors

Triggering Question: "WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES?"

#: Factor

- 1: THE LACK OF HOPE EMBEDDED WITHIN A CLEAR VISION FOR A UNITED FUTURE. Laouris
- 2: THE FACT THAT, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, REFUGEES LOOSE THEIR HOPE OF 'RETURN'. Laouris
- 3: THE SIMPLE BIOLOGICAL AGING OF PEOPLE WHO USED TO LIVE IN THE 'OTHER SIDE.' Laouris
- 4: THE FACT THAT CHILDREN GROW UP IN DIFFERENT MODELS OF THE WORLD (DIFFERENT CULTURE, PRIORITIES & DAILY PROBLEMS). Laouris
- 5: THE TENDENCY OF THE LEFT WING PARTIES IN THE SOUTH TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN 'BAD' AND 'GOOD' RAPPROCHEMENT. Laouris
- 6: THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF ANY INCENTIVES TO WORK FOR PEACE AND RE-UNIFICATION. Laouris
- 7: THE FACT THAT WITHIN THE GC SOCIETY THOSE ENGAGED IN PEACE ACTIVITIES ARE STIGMATIZED AS TRAITORS. Laouris
- 8: THE DIMINISHED FOREIGN SUPPORT TO THE INITIATIVES OF PEACE BUILDERS. Laouris
- 9: THE 'FORMALIZATION' OF THE CROSSING PROCESS. Laouris
- 10: PEOPLE WITH CRITICAL THINKING HAVE STEPPED OUT OF THE PROCESS. Laouris
- 11: UNCOMPROMISING REGIME OF MR. PAPADOPULOUS. Ahmet
- 12: COMFORT OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. Ahmet
- 13: LACK OF EMPATHY AND PRINCIPLE IN THE MEDIA (ON BOTH SIDES). Ahmet
- 14: PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE LEADERS ON BOTH SITES. Andros
- 15: MISTRUST OF THE MOTIVES OF THE OTHER SITE. Andros
- 16: PROPAGANDA IN THE MEDIA. Andros
- 17: FEAR OF ECONOMIC LOSS BY EACH SIDE. Andros
- 18: LEADERS ON EACH SIDE DO NOT WANT TO SHARE POWER. Andros
- 19: THE FAILURE OF THE REFERENDA TO PRODUCE A DOUBLE YES. Anlar
- 20: THE INEQUALITY IN INTER-COMMUNAL BUSINESS. Anlar
- 21: THE NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR OF SOME GCS TOWARDS TCS WHEN THEY TRAVEL TO THE SOUTH. Anlar
- 22: CYPRIOT MEDIA IS AGGRAVATING EVEN THE SMALLEST EVENT AND/OR SIMPLE STATEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS. Anlar
- 23: POLITICAL LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE. Anlar

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- 24: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTRA-PERSONAL LEVEL. Charis
- 25: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTER-PERSONAL LEVEL. Charis
- 26: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTER-GROUP LEVEL. Charis
- 27: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS/ IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL. Charis
- 28: NOT LISTENING TO EACH OTHER. Derya
- 29: PRESSURES ON GREEK CYPRIOT CIVIL SOCIETY. Derya
- 30: BLAME GAME. Derya
- 31: DISAPPOINTMENT OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS TOWARDS CHANGE. Derya
- 32: EU MEMBERSHIP. Derya
- 33: WRONG LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES. Hasip
- 34: LACK OF ENOUGH JOINT VENTURES AND TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. Hasip
- 35: STILL ONGOING ACTS OF AGGRESSION. Hasip
- 36: POPULAR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH POLITICAL ELITES. Isabelle
- 37: THE END OF THE MYSTERY. Isabelle
- 38: THE FAILURE OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE ANNAN PLAN IN THE G/C COMMUNITY. Isabelle
- 39: EU ACCESSION. Isabelle
- 40: THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SOCIAL COHERENCE BETWEEN THE 2 COMMUNITIES. Katie
- 41: POLITICAL POWER MEANS PARTY POLITICS. Katie
- 42: THE RULING POWER DOES NOT ALLOW ROOM FOR DIFFERENT VOICES OR CRITICISM TO BE HEARD. Katie
- 43: FAILURE OF THE PEOPLE SUPPORTING THE ANAN'S PLAN TO EXPLAIN THE BENEFITS OF THE PLAN TO THE PEOPLE. Lefteris
- 44: 'As soon as Tassos was elected he managed through various channels (DIKO, the media and also via personal talks and theater) to persuade a large portion of the GC population that the TC side does not want to find a solution. The attitude of TC politicians helped him capitalize and promote this idea further.
- 45: THE INADEQUACY OF THE TC POLITICIANS ( ESPECIALLY TALAT) TO FIND WAYS TO HELP GC POLITICIANS TRUST HIM AND WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION. Lefteris
- 46: THE MEDIA ON BOTH SIDES ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE THE NEGATIVES EVERYDAY AND NOT ANY POSITIVE POLITICAL ACTIONS. Lefteris

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47: THE PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF POLITICIANS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES. Lefteris

48: ANNAN PLAN RESULTS. Lisa

49: US VERSUS THEM. Lisa

50: THE OPENING OF THE GATES. Lisa

51: THE LACK OF COMMITMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES TO A SOLUTION. Maria

52: THE LACK OF A NEW IMAGINARY. Maria

53: RENEWED STEREOTYPES AND MISPERCEPTIONS. Maria

54: DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF GC PROPERTY IN THE NORTH. Maria

55: THE GC PERCEPTION THAT CYPRUS REPUBLIC GIVES A LOT TO TCS FREE OF CHARGE. Maria

56: THE NO RESULT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN THE REFERANDUM WERE PERCEIVED BY MANY TURKISH CYPRIOTS AS THOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DON'T WANT TO LIVE WITH THEM. Mustafa

57: THE POLITICIANS BLAME GAME IS NOT HELPING AT ALL. Mustafa

58: DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE NGO'S IN NORTH CYPRUS AND WEAK NGOS IN THE SOUTH WHO ARE SUPPRESSED. Mustafa

59: TURKISH CYPRIOTS STARTED BELIEVING THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS DO NOT WANT A BI-ZONAL BI-COMMUNAL FEDERATION BASED ON POLITICAL EQUALITY. Mustafa

60: THE EXTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CYPRIOT PROPERTY IN NORTH CYPRUS. Mustafa

61: SHIFT IN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES. Neophytos

62: ABSENCE OF ELITE ALLIES. Neophytos

63: ALTERNATIVES. Neophytos

64: ELITISM. Neophytos

65: NEW (?) IDENTITIES. Neophytos

66: LOSS OF HOPE FOR A SOLUTION DUE TO NEGATIVE RESULT OF REFERENDUM. Nese

67: POLITICAL ANOMALY IN CYPRUS WITH TWO STATES TRYING TO IMPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE OTHER COMMUNITY. Nese

68: NEGATIVE ATMOSPHERE BREEDING CONFLICT. Nese

69: LACK OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN G/C COMMUNITY. Nese

70: ATTITUDE OF POLITICAL LEADERS SETTING AN EXAMPLE. Nese

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- 71: FAILURES TO MEET EXPECTATIONS. Romina
- 72: THE ROLE OF MEDIA. Romina
- 73: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. Romina
- 74: THE FAILURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY. Romina
- 75: SPEECH OF HATE. Serdar
- 76: LOOTING OF PROPERTY RIGHTS. Serdar
- 77: DENIAL OF TURKISH CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. Serdar
- 78: ANGLO-AMERICANS' PARTITION ENGAGEMENT PLAN. Serdar
- 79: GROWING MILITARY PRESENCE AND INFLUX OF SETTLERS. Serdar
- 80: POWER SHEARING. Taner
- 81: NATIONALISM AND THE LACK OF SELF -CRITIC IN THE SOUTH. Ulus
- 82: THE TC STARTED TO SAY THAT MAJORITY OF THE GCS ARE NATIONALISTS. Ulus
- 83: THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS AND THE BOOKS SHOULD BE CHANGED URGENTLY. Ulus
- 84: CAN WE IMPLEMENT THE HUMANISTIC AND MULTICULTURAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR CYPRUS. Ulus
- 85: GCS DO NOT WANT TO SHARE POWER WITH THE MINORITY TCS. Yiannos
- 86: TCS ARE CONTENT WITH THE PRESENT STATUS QUO. Yiannos
- 87: PERSONAL INTERESTS. Yiota
- 88: THE HOSTILE CLIMATE THAT EXISTS FOR ANY BICOMMUNAL EVENTS. Yiota
- 89: IDENTITY PROBLEM. Yiota
- 90: LACK OF COMMON POLITICAL GOALS. Ahmet Djavit An
- 91: LACK OF COMMON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Ahmet Djavit An
- 92: THE ROLE OF THE COMPETING GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONALISMS IMPORTED FROM THE MAINLANDS. Ahmet Djavit An
- 93: THE WEAKNESS OF THE MOVEMENT FOR CYPRIOTISM. Ahmet Djavit An
- 94: THE ROLE OF IMPERIALISM ON OUR ISLAND. Ahmet Djavit An
- 95: NOT SHARING PAIN. Ali Erel

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96: HAVING EXTERNAL INFLUENCE. Ali Erel

97: BEING A PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. Ali Erel

98: EU BEING A POLITICAL DWARF. Ali Erel

99: INVOLVEMENT OF TURKEY. Ali Erel

# Table 2 List of Factors with Clarification

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## Factor 1: THE LACK OF HOPE EMBEDDED WITHIN A CLEAR VISION FOR A UNITED FUTURE. Laouris

*Hope is usually accompanied with the presence of some tangible "power." For example, "hope" within the circles of the poor and slaves in the years after Christ was related to the objective existence of Christianity. In the years following the two world wars, democratic progressive people were basing their hope to the existence of socialism. Such hopes existed independent of whether Christianity or Socialism were really going to deliver on their promises. It seems to me that humans need some kind of vision, some theory, some goal (even if it is unrealistic) in order to dare let their hopes develop. In the absence of such visions people refuse to let themselves start hoping.*

## Factor 2: THE FACT THAT, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH, REFUGEES LOOSE THEIR HOPE OF 'RETURN'. Laouris

*One third of the population of GCs is directly or indirectly a displaced person. For over 30 years they lived with the hope of return, whatever that meant. In many cases the hope was cloudy and they never tried to think it through and visualize what that would mean. The hope was somehow correlated with a hope for a better life, more money, happier living, re-connected families, more friends etc. In 2004 this hope became an option, its meaning was "crystallized" and subsequently it died out. Also the too high expectations that they would get back "everything." Now, it is much more difficult for someone to let himself/herself start hoping again.*

## Factor 3: THE SIMPLE BIOLOGICAL AGING OF PEOPLE WHO USED TO LIVE IN THE 'OTHER SIDE.' Laouris

*People who used to be 40+ are now 72+. Since they have lost their lives and also any hope to "return" or to see the problem solved they are now dissociated from the process. This results in "loosing" the portion of Cypriots who wanted re-unification the most. People who used to be between 20-40 are now 52-72. Thinking realistically they assume that no solution can be agreed and implemented within the next 10 years, therefore they see themselves also as non-participants or non-beneficiaries of any peace process.*

## Factor 4: THE FACT THAT CHILDREN GROW UP IN DIFFERENT MODELS OF THE WORLD (DIFFERENT CULTURE, PRIORITIES & DAILY PROBLEMS). Laouris

*Parents are usually pre-occupied with the lives of their children. Their daily lives are re-defined according to the priorities, and issues of concern of their children. The fact that children in the South and children in the North are pre-occupied with completely different priorities increases the formalizes the gap between the two communities.*

## Factor 5: THE TENDENCY OF THE LEFT WING PARTIES IN THE SOUTH TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN 'BAD' AND 'GOOD' RAPPROCHEMENT. Laouris

*This attitude calls people to disengage from any peace initiatives and await for their party to take the lead. Since their party has taken no initiative for over 2 years now, time alone leads to the death of any desire to work for peace. As a natural consequence of time, people are drawn into other life priorities. Alternatively, they loose their affiliation and bonds to their party and loose any leverages to provoke change. Eventually this approach reinforces inter-communal and cross communal polarization, which eventually concretizes even among those who used to be active in the peace movement.*

## Factor 6: THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF ANY INCENTIVES TO WORK FOR PEACE AND RE-UNIFICATION. Laouris

*There is absolutely no incentive for anyone to work for peace except their consciousness. One could define incentives as:*

- *Financial in terms of doing some projects or finding a job in an NGO*
- *Relations with diplomats*
- *Possibility to meet with Track 1 people*
- *Possibility for someone to make new friends and meet interesting people*
- *An area where someone could take actions and have fun*

*It would be interesting to compare with the "perceived incentives" that those involved 10 years ago.*

## Factor 7: THE FACT THAT WITHIN THE GC SOCIETY THOSE ENGAGED IN PEACE ACTIVITIES ARE STIGMATIZED AS TRAITORS. Laouris

*Who wants to be stigmatized as traitor? Who wants to be threatened? Who wants to be excluded from all circles?*

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## Factor 8: THE DIMINISHED FOREIGN SUPPORT TO THE INITIATIVES OF PEACE BUILDERS. Laouris

*In the years between 1993-2004 foreign governments, foreign media, foreign NGOs, foreign diplomats had a great interest about Cyprus. Their interest was boosting the will of peace builders to work and served as a form of encouragement. Now it all evaporated.*

## Factor 9: THE 'FORMALIZATION' OF THE CROSSING PROCESS. Laouris

*Between 1993-1997 those crossing the Gate never had to stand in front of a TC policeman, never had to show their Ids (they were collected by one TC and processed invisibly) and never had to fill in any form (those forms were pre-filled by the TC who was serving as the one inviting or by the UN person).*

*Now, the TC authorities insist on formalities reinforcing the existence of their "State." They do not accept old IDs anymore; they attack verbally visitors by saying things like "this is another country here" and they attempt to create a feeling that a visitor crosses formal country borders. Even the piece of paper given to the visitors says "Visa" and "TRNC". Car insurances are not valid, again reinforcing feeling that it is a different country. Also in the GC side, the presence and attitude of the customs people creates a sense of crossing country borders.*

*The fact that to call a TC from the South one must call a number in Turkey, reinforcing feeling that the "North is Turkey." The fact that to send a letter to a TC from anywhere in the world, it must be addressed to Turkey.*

## Factor 10: PEOPLE WITH CRITICAL THINKING HAVE STEPPED OUT OF THE PROCESS. Laouris

*This is due to a number of reasons of which some are local and others are more global.*

*Local: The masses are not only polarized, but also agitated and ready to "attack" those with a different opinion.*

*Global factors have to do with the fact that logic, ethics and principles are being violated at all levels in the international arenas, thus disappointing and alienating those who "think."*

## Factor 11: UNCOMPROMISING REGIME OF MR. PAPADOPULOUS. Ahmet

*\* No mention of power sharing with the other community, but only the "functionability" of the state.*

*\* His public statements.*

*\* His maximalist position.*

## Factor 12: COMFORT OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES. Ahmet

*\* Years of separation*

*\* Habits*

*\* Accustomed lifestyles*

*\* Risk aversion*

*\* Uncertainty of a solution*

## Factor 13: LACK OF EMPATHY AND PRINCIPLE IN THE MEDIA (ON BOTH SIDES). Ahmet

## Factor 14: PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE LEADERS ON BOTH SITES. Andros

## Factor 15: MISTRUST OF THE MOTIVES OF THE OTHER SITE. Andros

*MISTRUST OF THE MOTIVES OF THE OTHER SITE. Andros*

*G/C think that T/C are only interested to lift the isolation and slowly be recognized as a separate state*

*T/C think that G/C are only interested in absorbing them in a Unitary state and turn them into 2nd class citizens*

# Table 2 List of Factors with Clarification

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## Factor 16: PROPAGANDA IN THE MEDIA. Andros

*The language used by the media in presenting various events and the positions of each side*

## Factor 17: FEAR OF ECONOMIC LOSS BY EACH SIDE. Andros

*G/C are afraid of losing jobs, economic monopolies, economic benefits from the use of T/C lands*

*T/C are afraid of losing economic benefits from the use of G/C lands*

*T/C are afraid that the G/C will use their current economic strength to become even stronger at their expense.*

## Factor 18: LEADERS ON EACH SIDE DO NOT WANT TO SHARE POWER. Andros

## Factor 19: THE FAILURE OF THE REFERENDA TO PRODUCE A DOUBLE YES. Anlar

*A great number of TCs were hoping that both sides would approve the plan, leading to a final peaceful solution. The negative response of the GC community came as a disappointment. Gradually TCs started to believe that they are not wanted by GCs.*

## Factor 20: THE INEQUALITY IN INTER-COMMUNAL BUSINESS. Anlar

*After the opening of the check points, a lot of TCs have begun shopping in the south. There is an "impression" that GCs are refraining from doing the same in the north. This may be partly due to the Customs Officers' rigid behavior towards GCs who return to the south. They check their cars and bags for good bought in the north.*

## Factor 21: THE NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR OF SOME GCs TOWARDS TCs WHEN THEY TRAVEL TO THE SOUTH. Anlar

*Some GCs belittle TCs. They say we are a "minority" and should behave like a minority. They are surprised that TCs do not speak Greek. They make it clear that it is only natural for a "Cypriot" to speak the Greek language. Also recently, TC architects are being held by the police for allegedly possessing designs and plans of constructions on originally GC property.*

## Factor 22: CYPRIOT MEDIA IS AGGRAVATING EVEN THE SMALLEST EVENT AND/OR SIMPLE STATEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS. Anlar

*The media on both sides talk of negative things only about the other side. GC media is almost 99% of the time accusing TC authorities, and the TC media talks about the physical and psychological mistreatment of TCs by (some) GC civilians and officials.*

## Factor 23: POLITICAL LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES ARE POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE. Anlar

*Political leaders are always accusing "the other side" in almost everything. They have begun using the rhetoric of the recent decades. It is always "the other side" who doesn't want an agreement. It is always "the other side" who violates the UN/EU/bi-communally agreed points. It is always "the other side" who is trying to exploit "our" good will.*

## Factor 24: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTRA-PERSONAL LEVEL. Charis

*The cognitive processes of many people in their dealings with the idea of otherness are often structured on bipolarities of the us-them kind. Such simplified processes of categorization can be either nurtured or challenged by more complicated forms of categorization. Multiple forms of categorization are more likely to lead to the avoidance of prejudiced and stereotyping. There is also the need for use of semiotic means or symbolic resources that will mediate our interaction at the interpersonal level with others. These symbolic resources that need to be promoted are examples of successful cooperation between the communities in Cyprus. The principles of "mutual respect", "two can achieve more than one", and "common goal" should be brought into the Cypriot's thought in order to mediate our everyday life. Unfortunately there is little done in the way of promoting these principles despite the existence of such examples of co-operation in Cyprus.*

## Factor 25: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTER-PERSONAL LEVEL. Charis

*The contact between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots after the 23rd of April 2003 at the interpersonal level has been less than*

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*optimal in many ways. To start with 40% of Greek Cypriots have not yet crossed to the other side. Many Turkish-Cypriots who cross to the south work under conditions of asymmetry of status. Greek-Cypriots who cross mostly do it to "see" places not to "talk" to people, get to know each other or co-operate on common projects. This superficial nature of contacts now taking place hinders the co-ordination of perspectives and the creation of real dialogue. If anything after 23rd of April 2003 and the referendum bi-communal meetings that created the conditions for relations of co-operation have become a rare phenomenon. There is the need for institutionalization of meaningful contacts of different groups from sectors of society and interest groups under common goals. Meaningful contacts reduce inter-group anxiety and promote perspective taking and empathy that in turn mediate the reduction of prejudice towards the other.*

**Factor 26: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE INTER-GROUP LEVEL. Charis**

*The way political dialogue is undertaken by both authorities of the divide promotes polarization instead of real dialogue. There is clearly a lack of respect and a zero-sum rationale. Every single communication or statement from the representatives of the two communities in the last three years has been of this nature. Unless there is a change in the behavioural style of these communications the gap will only widen. There is also lack of communication between the leaders of the two communities which reinforces the lack of communication. There is the need to create examples of co-operation. The dead zone can be turned into a co-operation zone.*

**Factor 27: LACK OF SOCIAL RELATIONS OF CO-OPERATION AT THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS/ IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL. Charis**

*The media and the political parties are not doing enough to promote social representations that would support mutual respect and cooperation. With the exception of two newspapers there is no writing by members of the other community. This reinforces monologicality. The political parties do not meet with a spirit for cooperation. They see the meetings as a struggle for imposition. Most importantly, the ideological support for ideas of co-operation from the traditional left is becoming weakened. There is the need for political parties that cross the ethnic lines and mixed schools that will promote a new spirit of co-operation.*

**Factor 28: NOT LISTENING TO EACH OTHER. Derya**

*After the referenda, Turkish Cypriots feel rejected by Greek Cypriots and Greek Cypriots feel misunderstood, neither of them trying to understand the other community.*

**Factor 29: PRESSURES ON GREEK CYPRIOT CIVIL SOCIETY. Derya**

*State pressure is put on Greek Cypriots that try to extend a hand to the Turkish Cypriots.*

**Factor 30: BLAME GAME. Derya**

*Both sides are back to blaming the 'other'. Media on both sides of the island is hugely controlled by governing parties and contributes to the blame game increasing nationalism.*

**Factor 31: DISAPPOINTMENT OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS TOWARDS CHANGE. Derya**

*Efforts of Turkish Cypriots to change the Status quo failed leaving them in disbelief that they can contribute to reunification.*

**Factor 32: EU MEMBERSHIP. Derya**

*Cyprus' EU membership left no leverage for Greek Cypriot government to work towards a settlement while Turkey's membership prospects lead to Cyprus Problem being used as a negotiation chip.*

**Factor 33: WRONG LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES. Hasip**

*The leadership in the South seeks a solution on the basis of unitary state  
The leadership in the North follows the directives of Turkey and seeks a solution on the basis of partition*

**Factor 34: LACK OF ENOUGH JOINT VENTURES AND TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. Hasip**

*Interdependence has not been created between the people of the two communities*

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## Factor 35: STILL ONGOING ACTS OF AGGRESSION. Hasip

*Although in small scale Still continuing acts of aggression against the member of the other community and this being exploited by elements who are against the unification in Cyprus in both communities*

## Factor 36: POPULAR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH POLITICAL ELITES. Isabelle

*From a G/C perspective, I feel that it is unclear what the 'real' goals of the T/C leadership are. There seems to be a gap between the political discourse and political action in the T/C community. That means that while the T/C leadership seems to be talking about 'reunification' of the island, it follows quite clearly a typical approach based on strategic short-term interest, which to a large extent compromise the stated long-term goal of reunification. Consequently, Mr. Talat is perceived to have adopted a policy that is in line with (mainland) Turkish interests and that is obviously threatening to the average G/C. When Mr. Denktash was in power, it was clear what T/C political goals were... what does Mr. Talat's want for his community? Where is the man of reconciliation that some of us supported in the G/C community?*

## Factor 37: THE END OF THE MYSTERY. Isabelle

*It is sad to admit, but it seems that the opening of the checkpoints along the infamous Green Line has not helped to bring the two communities together. 'Free' circulation has taken away the element of the unknown of the other community and since the other is no longer exotic we are not interested in him/ her anymore. More importantly it has made the existence of bicomunal meetings superfluous, given that we are now able to meet 'freely' and without the intervention of outside powers. This lack of concrete contact though, has meant that, to a great extent, we rely on the media to inform ourselves about the other community. Unfortunately, at least in the G/C community, the media still plays a strong role in propagating nationalistic feelings.*

## Factor 38: THE FAILURE OF THE REFERENDUM ON THE ANNAN PLAN IN THE G/C COMMUNITY. Isabelle

*The resounding 'NO' of the G/Cs on the Annan Plan has created much disappointment in the T/C community. There is a feeling, I suppose, among T/Cs of having been betrayed by AKEL and therefore there is apathy toward taking the initiative in meeting the other. More importantly, in the G/C community, having in power a coalition of hard core nationalist with a pseudo-leftist party has, on one hand, created much frustrations to those of us who took the risk to support bicomunal activities and engage with other community, and on the other, created a lethargy and disinterest in the other community more widely in the G/C community. Nothing Mr. Papadopoulos says inspires bicomunal-ism; quite the contrary! His nationalist discourse is unfortunately uncritically followed by many G/Cs.*

## Factor 39: EU ACCESSION. Isabelle

*There is a complete misperception in the G/C community that EU accession is only for them and that the EU will come and save them from the Turkish occupiers with their European Rapid Reaction Force. It's all bollocks! More information is needed on what the EU is about and what it is willing and able to do for Cyprus. Again we must refer back to the role of the media in Cyprus! In the T/C community I feel there needs to be an understanding that linking Turkish EU accession to the Cyprus problem is detrimental to a solution to our political problem and to the stated goal of 'reunification' of the island. There is much anxiety in the EU Member States about Turkey becoming part of the EU and it is based on issues completely unrelated to the Cyprus problem. As a result, many obstacles and challenges will be posed to Turkey by a number of EU Member States. Expecting the EU to play the game fairly is clearly out of reach... Lets face it, there is nothing honest in politics!*

## Factor 40: THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO SOCIAL COHERENCE BETWEEN THE 2 COMMUNITIES. Katie

*The 3 communities have lived separately for more than 45 years since 1983 and during the independence years they didn't have the chance to mix together (1960-1963) No institutions function to bring the 2 communities together. The fact that TC come to greek hospitals or people cross either to play at the casinos or to shop does not represent a common life.*

## Factor 41: POLITICAL POWER MEANS PARTY POLITICS. Katie

*The prevailing political discourses are formulated within the realm of the political parties only there are no strong movements of NGOs to produce political discourse or to take strong stand for or against a policy therefore people have no real voice, at least in the south. Only the politicians are heard.*

# Table 2 List of Factors with Clarification

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**Factor 42: THE RULING POWER DOES NOT ALLOW ROOM FOR DIFFERENT VOICES OR CRITICISM TO BE HEARD.** Katie  
*The lack of mechanisms to empower people to take initiative and say what they want. Everything is filtered through the power exercised by those who rule. If people say something different they are traitors and are marginalized therefore afraid to speak and unable to dream.*  
*A CITIZENS' WATCH would be ultimately a common institution to safeguard the quality of life of the citizens of both sides, ex on matters of health, consumer goods, clean environment etc*

**Factor 43: FAILURE OF THE PEOPLE SUPPORTING THE ANAN'S PLAN TO EXPLAIN THE BENEFITS OF THE PLAN TO THE PEOPLE.** Lefteris

- " *Unfortunately, GC were not informed in time about the plan, and they were manipulated by the opponents of the plan.*
- " *Usually, people need a lot of time in order to accept the idea of big changes. Radical changes scares people, especially when these changes affect their lives, financial and professional status.*
- " *Opponents of the plan capitalized on fears and insecurities of people.*
- " *Supporters of the plan failed to work long time before people had to decide and failed*

**Factor 44: 'As soon as Tassos was elected he managed through various channels (DIKO, the media and also via personal talks and theater) to persuade a large portion of the GC population that the TC side does not want to find a solution. The attitude of TC politicians helped him capitalize and promote this idea further.**

- " *As soon as Tassos was elected he managed through various channels (DIKO, the media and also via personal talks and theater) to persuade a large portion of the GC population that the TC side does not want to find a solution. The attitude of TC politicians helped him capitalize and promote this idea further.*

**Factor 45: THE INADEQUACY OF THE TC POLITICIANS ( ESPECIALLY TALAT) TO FIND WAYS TO HELP GC POLITICIANS TRUST HIM AND WORK TOGETHER TO FIND A SOLUTION.** Lefteris

- " *Although Talat started as the TC politician who will help solve the problem (as opposed to Denktash) as the time goes by he seem to prefer to satisfy the nationalists and Turkey instead of fighting for Cypriots and find a solution.*

**Factor 46: THE MEDIA ON BOTH SIDES ARE TRYING TO PROMOTE THE NEGATIVES EVERYDAY AND NOT ANY POSITIVE POLITICAL ACTIONS.** Lefteris

- " *It is easier to complain about the negatives of the other side. We keep our people happy that the fault is on the other side*
- " *TV, radio stations and newspapers are controlled by nationalists who have interests to continue the situation as it is instead of giving some of what we have and make a new beginning.*

**Factor 47: THE PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS OF POLITICIANS AND ORDINARY PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES.** Lefteris

- " *On the GC side: The politicians interests to stay in power (AKEL, DIKO, EDEK)*
- " *The interests of the GC businessmen who don't want to share what they have and are afraid of the idea of having the TC take a piece of the financial pie.*
- " *The interests of the TC politicians not to come in direct opposition with nationalists, the military and Turkey.*
- " *The interests of TC to use the land of GC and built houses and businesses instead of trying to find a solution first.*

**Factor 48: ANNAN PLAN RESULTS.** Lisa

*It's no news that the referendum results have dampened bicomunal relationships. But I think there needs to be more discussion as to why the results have hurt the dialogue. In general one can sense a feeling of betrayal among Turkish Cypriots regarding the results, and a feeling of being ignored or misunderstood among Greek Cypriots regarding the results.*  
*There seems to be a surface level discussion about the results that ignores a lot of important feelings and positions. The surface reasoning says that the Turkish Cypriot vote was inspired by their desires for peace and future togetherness, while the Greek*

# Table 2 List of Factors with Clarification

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*Cypriot vote was inspired by fear, selfishness, and their true desires to remain separate from Turkish Cypriots. The international community constantly repeats this assumption. But, that is the surface level analysis. If we look deeper, and listen deeper, we see and hear a very different story.*

*There is more to the results than is often discussed, and I think a deeper discussion regarding this simple analysis of the vote is needed, especially among bicomunalists. Why someone voted yes or no isn't such a simple thing to answer, and even the most active bicomunalist could have voted against the Plan (Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot). This doesn't necessarily mean that they do not want to live with the other side or that they are selfish. An extreme right-winger could have voted for the Plan, (Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot) and this also doesn't necessarily mean that they want peace and want to live with their neighbors. I think that bicomunalists really need to talk about the yes/no vote together. I also think that part of the problem that has emerged with this distinction of yes/no votes is that to some extent, Turkish Cypriots have agreed with the analysis, and that Greek Cypriots have become extra defensive about the analysis, and without a deeper discussion about them, the gap between the communities is growing.*

## **Factor 49: US VERSUS THEM. Lisa**

*I think that when so many changes occurred in such a short span of time (the opening of the gates, the referendum, the EU), that people didn't know how to deal with it all. What was always the fallback option in Cyprus was the "us versus them" mentality, nationalistic thinking of Greek Cypriots vs. Turkish Cypriots. Of course there are divisions within each community, but there has never been a public space in which to discuss and debate those "internal" divisions. Those divisions seemed to have grown over the past few years - but public polls, news stories, and other media info seems to convey that each side is becoming more unified in their opinion of the other side, to reinforce the "us vs. them" mentality of the past. I believe that there are more divisions within each community now, but there isn't a space in which to discuss this, or acknowledge it, or try and work through it. It is as though the silence within each community about their internal differences has grown, and that seems to be a dangerous thing. And with that silence comes a stronger voice defending one community against the wrongs of the other, and an easy (and familiar) slide back into nationalistic thinking and behavior, which has contributed to the growing gap between the two communities.*

## **Factor 50: THE OPENING OF THE GATES. Lisa**

*Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can cross and interact with each other everyday. But I think that while the majority of the interactions are courteous, they're also shallow, and that they're creating a gap between people on both sides. I also feel that larger distinctions (like economic ones) between members of both communities are more "obvious" now that people are interacting (as boss/employee for example) or now that people can actually see the other side for the first time in years. And I feel that these distinctions are creating new stereotypes of the other side that are affecting the desire for dialogue. Again, I don't think that people have been able to deal with the changes on the island, especially the opening of the gates, in a constructive way. It was a huge shock to the system that was in place for so long, and people have adapted to it as best they could, but they haven't had the space to be able to talk about or even acknowledge the consequences of the opening on their lives, their experiences, their emotions and their perceptions. When you pair that with the referendum results, and the growing nationalisms on the island, you have a growing gap between the two communities.*

## **Factor 51: THE LACK OF COMMITMENT OF THE LEADERSHIP ON BOTH SIDES TO A SOLUTION. Maria**

*The fact that there are no negotiations and serious initiatives since the defeat of the Annan plan create the impression that the status quo is an option and the leaderships are caught in a confrontational mode which discourages citizens from becoming active and thus retreat to complacency.*

## **Factor 52: THE LACK OF A NEW IMAGINARY. Maria**

*There is lack of a shared vision and understanding of basic terms such as 'reunification', reunified inland' co-existence, political equality, etc both at the level of governing elites and the society.*

## **Factor 53: RENEWED STEREOTYPES AND MISPERCEPTIONS. Maria**

*After April 2003 the people-to-people's dynamic had not been transformed into new political initiatives so as to recognize the contribution of citizens' contact to the peace building processes. Instead it was left up to the individuals. Gradually this led to creation of new stereotypes such as 'the GCs come to the north because they buy things cheaper here and not because they want*

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*to know us or live with us..." or the "GCs are very materialistic, they only want their properties back to become richer ..." or the "TC doctors and dentists are not good professionals and don't go" or "are you not afraid? The Turkish military will arrest you as they did with others..."*

**Factor 54: DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF GC PROPERTY IN THE NORTH. Maria**

*TH GC refugees who see their own land and property been used and built on feel very angry and mistrustful of the TC leadership and the TC community. This indicates to them that they do not want a solution that is the change of the status quo. Thus the two separate state concept is promoted,*

**Factor 55: THE GC PERCEPTION THAT CYPRUS REPUBLIC GIVES A LOT TO TCS FREE OF CHARGE. Maria**

*The GCs complain that the government gives to TCs free medical treatment (access to hospitals), TC students do not pay at the English school or if they come to the university, The attitude is "This cost us millions and they do not pay any taxes,,,,," It is often said that GCs employ thousands of TC workers and they should appreciate this. GCs believe that the TCs want both: the benefits from the Republic (passports, ID, medical care, etc) and their separate state. Such interpretations breed contempt, mistrust and distancing.*

**Factor 56: THE NO RESULT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN THE REFERANDUM WERE PERCEIVED BY MANY TURKISH CYPRIOTS AS THOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DON'T WANT TO LIVE WITH THEM. Mustafa**

*THE NO RESULT OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS IN THE REFERANDUM WERE PERCEIVED BY MANY TURKISH CYPRIOTS AS THOUGH THE GREEK CYPRIOTS DON'T WANT TO LIVE WITH THEM. Mustafa*

**Factor 57: THE POLITICIANS BLAME GAME IS NOT HELPING AT ALL. Mustafa**

**Factor 58: DISEMPOWERMENT OF THE NGO'S IN NORTH CYPRUS AND WEAK NGOS IN THE SOUTH WHO ARE SUPPRESSED. Mustafa**

*Write a paragraph (or list some bullet points) that clarifies and elaborates this action.  
During 2002-2004 NGOs in north Cyprus were organizing mass demonstrations for solution and EU membership against intransigent policies of Mr. Denka?. NGOs in North Cyprus were policy makers up to a certain point. The positive messages given to Greek Cypriots for a common future was important. Now it is only the politicians who are exchanging non friendly messages which is observed by the people.*

**Factor 59: TURKISH CYPRIOTS STARTED BELIEVING THAT GREEK CYPRIOTS DO NOT WANT A BI-ZONAL BI-COMMUNAL FEDERATION BASED ON POLITICAL EQUALITY. Mustafa**

**Factor 60: THE EXTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CYPRIOT PROPERTY IN NORTH CYPRUS. Mustafa**

**Factor 61: SHIFT IN OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES. Neophytos**

*Social mobilization has long been linked to cycles of political opportunity structures (Tarrow, McAdam, Tilly). In the case of Cyprus the absence of negotiations or any prospect for a settlement make the role of peace-conflict groups less relevant now than two years ago. In simple words most people will say "I did what I had to before the referendum, I feel OK with my consciousness until these people are in power there is nothing useful I can do. All I can do now is to hope and try that circumstances will change at the leadership level"*

**Factor 62: ABSENCE OF ELITE ALLIES. Neophytos**

*There is little support either at the government or more generally at the 'elite level'. Tassos was successful at pointing his finger on bicomunal groups and the funding supposedly received at the referendum. Unfortunately civil society has not managed yet to defend itself and project a more socially acceptable image.*

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Triggering Question: "WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES?"

**Factor 63: ALTERNATIVES. Neophytos**

*Do I need a bicomunal group to meet TCs or GCs? I can just drive to their houses now.*

**Factor 64: ELITISM. Neophytos**

*This point goes back to the period before the referendum. We have been accused for elitism and although I know this is not true, perceptions matter. I am not sure how this problem could be solved.*

**Factor 65: NEW (?) IDENTITIES. Neophytos**

*Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have developed two different forms of identification. These appear to me quite mature identities (they are neither Greek nor Turkish nor Cypriot nationalisms) but a GreekCypriotism and TurkishCypriotism. Asking why people do not meet any more is likely asking why Russians don't meet Ukrainians. I think each community cares primarily about his or her pressing local issues. You might find my comparison to Russia and Ukraine strange but if you look at the newspapers in the two sides there is so little interest in what is happening at the other side (in other words we are treating each other as a different entity).*

**Factor 66: LOSS OF HOPE FOR A SOLUTION DUE TO NEGATIVE RESULT OF REFERENDUM. Nese**

*After the referendum there has been no serious initiative and the International community seems to have lost there interest in Cyprus*

**Factor 67: POLITICAL ANOMALY IN CYPRUS WITH TWO STATES TRYING TO IMPOSE THEMSELVES TO THE OTHER COMMUNITY. Nese**

*Both the Republic of Cyprus and TRNC is not recognized by the other community whereas they try to exert their power to the other community. The exit from this political anomaly was a Federal State which did not have an approval from the Greek Cypriot comm?nity*

**Factor 68: NEGATIVE ATMOSPHERE BREEDING CONFLICT. Nese**

*The negative atmosphere in general is leading to misinterpretation on every issue. The other community is taken wrong because of a general understanding that they are not willing to connect with us.*

**Factor 69: LACK OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN G/C COMMUNITY. Nese**

*We can not talk about a civil society in the Greek Cypriot community since almost all NGO's are connected with political parties 70% of which are in the government.*

**Factor 70: ATTITUDE OF POLITICAL LEADERS SETTING AN EXAMPLE. Nese**

*The two political leaders keep blaming the other side on every occasion and this sets a negative example*

**Factor 71: FAILURES TO MEET EXPECTATIONS. Romina**

*Both TCs and GCs had certain expectations for both bicomunal activities and the Peace talks/Anan Plan and where they would lead. Each community might have had different expectations and perhaps even too high expectations but they were expectations nevertheless and neither the political leadership nor the plan nor civil society succeeded to meet them. For example, GCs were expecting a more favorable UN Plan, TCs were expecting a more positive GC attitude towards a solution, etc.*

**Factor 72: THE ROLE OF MEDIA. Romina**

*The role of media has been devastating to bicomunal activities since the beginning of the activities in the early nineties. . Those involved have been accused of treachery and the media has negatively portrayed their work. This coupled with the growing anti-GC and TC feeling (respectively), as well as the political control over mass media and the lack of freedom of speech have not only widened the gap for interaction but also the desire to interact.*

**Factor 73: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. Romina**

*Not much need to say a lot here... The attitude of both political leaderships have not only made it difficult for the communities to connect, relate, work together etc. but have formed public opinion in a negative way for those few who do. The control over the mass media, the abuse of freedom of speech and other basic human rights have only made it more difficult for the communities to find the strength to narrow the gap between them. Moreover, this control over the mass media and the influence over forming public*

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*opinion (brainwashing?) have made it more difficult for the common public to recognize the political (personal?) agenda of their respective political leadership.*

**Factor 74: THE FAILURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY. Romina**

*Without trying to be too critical and by recognizing the many obstacles set to civil society it has nevertheless failed to succeed and meet the goals it had set up for itself. Many reasons have contributed to its failure and I believe that most of them came outside civil society itself (lack of funding, diminished international support, negative mass media, negative portrayals from the government, public opinion, etc) but regardless we have also failed to survive. It can be that civil society is still very young in Cyprus and doesn't have a strong foundation but we need to recognize our failures in order to be able to survive and sustain ourselves in the future.*

**Factor 75: SPEECH OF HATE. Serdar**

*Politicians and Media on both sides have a disgusting speech of hate every day, every hour and minute in order to deliberately distance TC and GC communities from each other.*

**Factor 76: LOOTING OF PROPERTY RIGHTS. Serdar**

*People feel frustrated with multiplied exploitation of their property rights. It not only escalates gap between two communities but also creates social and economic injustices mono-communally. Undeserved wealth has led to an additional split within the Turkish Cypriot community between the ones who don't respect the rule of international law and the ones who insist on abiding.*

**Factor 77: DENIAL OF TURKISH CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS. Serdar**

*The R o Cy authorities are putting hindrances onto the constitutional citizenship rights of Turkish Cypriots. Power sharing and the right to elect or being elected are some examples of it. The free enjoyment of possessions left in the South is another.*

**Factor 78: ANGLO-AMERICANS' PARTITION ENGAGEMENT PLAN. Serdar**

*Anglo-Americans have enforced a new strategic plan to make people on both sides believe that partition is unavoidable and two communities cannot coexist in peace and harmony anymore. Of course they talk different but their course of action is absolutely in the direction I explain.*

**Factor 79: GROWING MILITARY PRESENCE AND INFLUX OF SETTLERS. Serdar**

**Factor 80: POWER SHEARING. Taner**

*Power shearing is a state of mind accepting shearing power over the island of Cyprus. Without this shift in mine set, resolving any other issues is next to impossible.*

**Factor 81: NATIONALISM AND THE LACK OF SELF -CRITIC IN THE SOUTH. Ulus**

*In both of the sides the negative elements are still maintaining. The Military rule of Turkey in the North and the existing of Hellenistic nationalism in the South. Because of this (Hellenistic Nationalism) GC compatriots never initiated a self- critic to find out their wrongs in the Cyprus Problem. Without waging a struggle against the status-quos in both of the sides nothing will be done. But I have to draw your attention: Despite the harsh Turkish regime in the North most of the TC intellectuals criticized their rulers and made their self critics and about five years ago TCs were ready to break down the barricades. Unfortunately the South side has never understood why the TCs rebelled against their rulers. The lack of understanding the TCs postponed the solution. Also it is seen that the solving of Cyprus Problem have been extended to twenty years which means partition of the island. The obstinacy of the present leadership in the South side also seperated and caused rhe rise of new prejudices. For example during the activities in Pyla and Ledra palace, I was given to the trial , The regime wanted 15 years of my imprisonment, my brother's car was bombed, there was a very cruel campaign against me almost I was going to be dismissed from my job but I have never given up.*

**Factor 82: THE TC STARTED TO SAY THAT MAJORITY OF THE GCS ARE NATIONALISTS. Ulus**

*There are 15000 workers passing the barricades daily and going to the South but their images and impressions are very negative about the South. Most of them because of the nationalistic humiliations and insults are reluctant to go and work in the South now.*

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*They say that the GCs have never changed since 1963-64. They say that in 1963-64 they were nationalists and they are the same people now. Unfortunately most of the TC workers say that Denktash was right to demand partition because he knew that GCs have never changed. There is a TC saying in the North like this (If you want to be a good Turkish nationalist go to the South, the reaction that you will see there will make you a very good Turkish nationalist" It is also inclusively spoken that majority of the GCs are very religious, nationalists and even the AKEL sympathizers are like that (Last week I had a very bad experience about AKEL but I will not write here). Before 2003 It was true that even the TCs imagined that the GCs regarded themselves as Cypriots but contrastly after the barricades opened it was proved that majority of the GCs don't regard themselves as Cypriots. Among the harsh and rude GC employers there are AKEL sympathizers they say, and generally GCs left wing or right wing are the same. The main similarity in the GC community is that the GC community is a very Hellenistic nationalist community. They say that they have never analysed themselves from avenging 1974 events and they are very hateful to the TCs. Also it is spoken that the GCs regard the TC like the Turkish settlers coming from Turkey and they see the TCs as a homogenous community.*

## **Factor 83: THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS AND THE BOOKS SHOULD BE CHANGED URGENTLY. Ulus**

*Especially the history books should be changed, and the GC parties should not hide themselves behind the invention. Because until 1974 the GC rulers and politicians had many mistakes caused the Turkish occupation. And the fact that the real victims of the occupation are always ignored. By abandoning their homes the GCs left the North. But the TCs are still living with the occupation. But after the TCs saw the realities and the hypocritical approaches and Hellenistic analysis in the South the TCs started to bow their heads for the occupation and accept the status quo. They say that the real partitionists were the GC majority and Papadopoulos himself and let's accept our fate. Neither the GCs nor the Turkish state are suitable for them. They say that the two sides of the stick are dirty but the present situation is more acceptable because at least nobody kill each other in a nationalistic way. They say let's taste a life because nobody will see Cyprus after 20 years even Papadopoulos himself.*

## **Factor 84: CAN WE IMPLEMENT THE HUMANISTIC AND MULTICULTURAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR CYPRUS. Ulus**

*I think we should continue to activate in the bicomunal activities but this time the universities should join us. If the South side doesn't agree with this I am not sure that we will be successful like we were in Pyla.*

## **Factor 85: GCS DO NOT WANT TO SHARE POWER WITH THE MINORITY TCS. Yiannos**

*I grew up with the notion that the 1960 agreements were unfair. It seems that most GCs never overcame this. Most of the politicians never cared to tell them what the agreements meant and later what a bizonal bicomunal federation meant.*

## **Factor 86: TCS ARE CONTENT WITH THE PRESENT STATUS QUO. Yiannos**

*A rather myopic approach but taking onto consideration that they created a lot of political capital, and have lots more of money compared with the Denktash era, why change?*

## **Factor 87: PERSONAL INTERESTS. Yiota**

*It was unthinkable for AKEL and the president to 'rush' for a solution one year after they got the political power in their hands. They haven't negotiated the plan and they haven't said that they won't support it. Thus instead of having a better, negotiated version of it to decide for, we had the plan that the 'others' tailored for us. They projected their responsibility for betterment into blaming the others. That was the -gear/force- they used to divert the will of people to move forward for a solution to lead them backwards again in a stalemate position. This of course suits who? Only them. It suits them fine to remain in power as long as they wish.*

## **Factor 88: THE HOSTILE CLIMATE THAT EXISTS FOR ANY BICOMMUNAL EVENTS. Yiota**

*It is the first time that people feel that any efforts or any events done, for bringing the two communities together are not accommodated by the government. They are not accepted and they are seen as a direct attack on the government.*

## **Factor 89: IDENTITY PROBLEM. Yiota**

*It is very obvious that in all levels there is an identity problem. Are we Cypriots? And what does this mean? This problem was always in existence but now is more apparent. The present political climate helps the emergence of thoughts, actions of extreme ethnicities and one of the consequences is the spreading of fear.*

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## Factor 90: LACK OF COMMON POLITICAL GOALS. Ahmet Djavit An

*\* The nationalists on both sides have historically intervened whenever political cooperation of the G/C and T/C took place at the parliamentary level for local economic matters during the British period. The lack of common economical ventures could not create the material basis for a political common goal. The G/C community saw enosis the only way out, excluding the autonomy or independence of the island, which alienated the T/C.*

## Factor 91: LACK OF COMMON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. Ahmet Djavit An

*\* The British preferred to keep separate educational institutions and structures, avoiding English language education (except the English School for the children of the elites)*

## Factor 92: THE ROLE OF THE COMPETING GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONALISMS IMPORTED FROM THE MAINLANDS. Ahmet Djavit An

*\* The cultural and political influences of the mainlands were decisive in the formation of the ideologies among both communities in Cyprus. Especially the support of nationalist policies by the AKEL is to blame for the division of the working class movement.*

## Factor 93: THE WEAKNESS OF THE MOVEMENT FOR CYPRIOTISM. Ahmet Djavit An

*\* Cypriot patriotism has been an intellectual current, rather than a deeply rooted common political activity. Its characteristics have been living among the ordinary people without becoming an ideologized movement.*

## Factor 94: THE ROLE OF IMPERIALISM ON OUR ISLAND. Ahmet Djavit An

*\* Anglo-american imperialism was very successful in exploiting the differences of development between the G/C and the T/C.*

## Factor 95: NOT SHARING PAIN. Ali Erel

- *The two communities on the island NOT having the similar altitude of pain from the continuation of the "no solution" of the conflict on the island.*
- *The communities in general, do not try to feel the agony of the other community.*

## Factor 96: HAVING EXTERNAL INFLUENCE. Ali Erel

*Communities do not try to be themselves;*

- *Turkish Cypriots, in general, give priority to Turkey's interests before their communal benefits and depend on Turkey's influence for implementing (or not implementing) things.*
- *Greek Cypriots, instead of using their communal sincerity and dynamics as tools for a solution, they prefer using external powers, most recently the EU institutions, to push Turkish Cypriots into a corner.*

## Factor 97: BEING A PART OF THE MIDDLE EAST POLITICS. Ali Erel

*Policy makers for the area (Middle East) have their own plans for Cyprus, Turkey and the other countries in the region. Within these plans, solution of the Cyprus problem does not have the priority. On the contrary, the cost of no solution to the Cypriots is no concern to them.*

## Factor 98: EU BEING A POLITICAL DWARF. Ali Erel

- *Cyprus being a member of the EU,*
  - *All Cypriots being EU citizens,*
  - *Cyprus island being EU territory,*
  - *Having decades long political conflict on the island,*
  - *The EU not being equipped to deal with the political problems yet,*
- combination of these are creating an unmanageable situation.*

# Table 2 List of Factors with Clarification

Triggering Question: "WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN THE GREEK CYPRIOT AND THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES?"

## Factor 99: INVOLVEMENT OF TURKEY. Ali Erel

*Due to Turkey facing;*

- *not receiving clear signals from the EU about where she will end up with the EU process,*
- *not yet giving decision about where she wants to end up with the EU,*
- *concepts of democracy, human rights, liberal economy, social justice etc. are all very new for Turkey and she will need decades for decide which is good for her*
- *military / civilian relations in Turkey,*
- *religion / state relationship,*