I think what you're looking for, Jim, is Kant's distinction between 'pure'
and 'empirical' intuition. He says (A19-B33):
"In whatever manner and by whatever means a mode of knowledge may relate to
objects, INTUITION is that through which it is in immediate relation to
them, and to which all thought as a means is directed. But intuition takes
place only insofar as an object is given to us. ...The capacity
(receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we
are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are GIVEN to us
by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us INTUITIONS; they are
THOUGHT through the understanding, and from the understanding arise
CONCEPTS. But all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain
characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with us, to
sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us."
So, intuition is a type of representation carried by the faculty of
sensibility. The other basic type of representation is the concept, and
that is carried by the faculty of the understanding.
Kant then goes on (A20-B34) to distinguish empirical from pure intuition.
Empirical intuition he defines as: 'that intuition which is in relation to
the object through sensation.' He then distinguishes the 'matter' of an
empirical intuition from its 'form' and illustrates what he means by the
former by mentioning such qualities as 'impenetrability, hardness, color,
etc.'.
Pure intuition (cf. A21-B35) is the 'pure form of sensibility'. It is what
is left when I abstract from a representation of an object all that is put
into it by the faculty of the understanding (e.g. substance, force,
divisibility. etc.) and all that belongs to the matter of sensation (e.g.
hardness, color, etc.). What is left, says Kant, is extension and figure.
These, he says, belong to
"...pure intuition, which, even without any actual object of the senses or
sensation, exists in the mind A PRIORI as a mere form of sensibility".
Kant thought that two different pure intuitions formed the basis of our
mathematical knowledge: a pure intuition of time for arithmetic and a pure
intuition of space for geometry. Frege did not believe that a Kantian pure
intuition of time could be basic enough to our thinking to account for the
pervasive applicability of arithmetical laws. Hence, he rejected Kant's
account of arithmetical knowledge. He accepted his view of geometrical
knowledge, however, because geometry lacked the ubiquity or universality
that he saw as characteristic of arithmetic. It, therefore, could be driven
by a non-universally applicable cognitive force (or form of intuition) such
as a pure intuition of space.
I hope that this helps, Jim, and that it is the type of thing you were
looking for.
Mic Detlefsen
P.S. I'll make some comments on Gordon Fisher's remarks in a few days.
Right now, I'm immersed in beginning of the term business, interviewing job
candidates, etc..
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Michael Detlefsen
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
U.S.A.
e-mail: Detlefsen.1@nd.edu
FAX: 219-631-8609
Office phone: 219-631-7534
Home phone: 219-232-7273
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