Subject: Re: [HM] Kant and non-Euclidean geometry
From: William Tait (wwtx@midway.uchicago.edu)
Date: Sat Mar 11 2000 - 14:47:49 EST
A brief comment on David Stump's posting (Sat, 11 Mar 2000). He wrote
> Since Leibniz hold the bizarre sounding view that every truth is
> analytic, it seems to me that there is no special issue about the
> status of geometry here.
Good point, but slightly overstated, I think: true propositions such
as `Socrates is a man', which (as Leibniz understood them) imply the
existence of a substance, are not analytic, although the proposition
that `being Socrates is being a man' is analytic. The former for him
consists of the latter together with the affirmation of the existence
of Socrates, and so depends on the principle of sufficient reason (as
well as the principle of non-contradiction).
Also, my puzzlement about Leibniz's use of `analytic' is none the
less because he extends it to all (let's say) ideal truths.
Bill Tait
-- William W. Tait Professor Emeritus of Philosophy University of Chicago wwtx@midway.uchicago.edu Home: 5522 S. Everett Ave Chicago, IL 60637 (773) 241-7288
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